Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1997

Aboriginal Rights in Canada in 1996: An Overview of the Decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada
Kent McNeil
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, kmcneil@osgoode.yorku.ca

Source Publication:
Indigenous Law Bulletin 4:2

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons

Repository Citation
McNeil, Kent, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada in 1996: An Overview of the Decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada" (1997). Articles & Book Chapters. 2535.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/2535

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

McNeil, Kent --- "Aboriginal Rights in Canada in 1996: An
Overview of the Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada"
[1997] IndigLawB 42; (1997) 4(2) Indigenous Law Bulletin 4
Aboriginal Rights in Canada in 1996: An Overview of the
Decisions of the Supreme Court OF Canada
By Kent McNeil
Measured by judicial decisions, 1996 was by far the most significant year for Aboriginal rights in
Canada since 1990, when the Supreme Court of Canada, in R v Sparrow,[1] first examined the
effect of recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act 1982.[2] The Sparrow decision acknowledged that section 35(1) provides
unextinguished Aboriginal rights with constitutional protection against legislative infringement,
unless the infringement can be justified by a strict test, outlined below, which the Supreme Court
created. However, that decision did not address the vital question of how Aboriginal rights are to
be identified and defined. In 1996, the Court was confronted with that question, and answered it
in a way that has very serious consequences for Aboriginal rights.
The Supreme Court actually handed down nine decisions in 1996 involving Aboriginal and
treaty rights.[3] All but two of these involved Aboriginal fishing rights and the circumstances in
which those rights can be limited by Federal legislation.[4] The most important of these
decisions is R v Van der Peet,[5] where Lamer CJ, in his majority judgment, laid down this test
for determining the existence of an Aboriginal right:
`[I]n order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or
tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right'.[6]
Moreover, in order for an activity to qualify as an Aboriginal right, the practice, custom or
tradition it relates to must have continuity with a practice, custom or tradition that existed prior
to contact with Europeans.[7]
Lamer CJ explained that this requirement of continuity with pre-contact Aboriginal societies has
to be flexible enough to prevent `the rights from being frozen in pre-contact times'.[8] However,
as L'Heureux-Dubé J pointed out in her dissent, the Chief Justice's approach does in fact freeze
Aboriginal rights in the past by implying that `Aboriginal culture was crystallized in some sort of
"Aboriginal time" prior to the arrival of Europeans'.[9] While the flexibility Lamer CJ endorsed
does allow for evolution of pre-contact activities into modern forms, it does not permit activities
which arose as a result of European influences to be protected as Aboriginal rights. His approach
therefore entails a static conception of culture, and the misguided and somewhat absurd task of
trying to separate the present-day activities of Aboriginal peoples into what he regards as
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal elements on the basis of historical considerations.

Lamer CJ's approach to identification and definition of Aboriginal rights contains another aspect
which will limit those rights ever further. In Van der Peet, he said that their scope and content
must be determined on a specific rather than a general basis. The degree of specificity involved
here can be seen R v Gladstone,[1]0 one of the other fishing cases the Supreme Court decided last
year. In Gladstone, the Aboriginal right involved was not a general right to fish, or even a
narrower right to fish for some species, but a very particularised right to take herring spawn on
kelp for commercial purposes. This narrow approach to Aboriginal rights was rejected by both
L'Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ in their dissenting opinions in Van der Peet. McLachlin J put
it this way:
`[I]f we ask whether there is an Aboriginal right to a particular kind of trade in fish, ie, largescale commercial trade, the answer in most cases will be negative. On the other hand, if we ask
whether there is an Aboriginal right to use the fishery resource for the purpose of providing food,
clothing or other needs, the answer might be quite different ... I share the concern of L'HeureuxDubé J that the Chief Justice defines the rights at issue with too much particularity, enabling him
to find no Aboriginal right where a different analysis might find one'.[1]1
The effect of Lamer CJ's particularised approach can be seen in R v Pamajewon,[1]2 the only
Supreme Court decision in 1996 involving an Aboriginal right of self-government.[1]3 The
appellants in that case claimed that their First Nations had a general right of self-government
which encompassed the establishment and regulation of high-stakes gambling operations on their
reserves. In his judgment, which was concurred in by seven other members of the Court, Lamer
CJ assumed (without deciding) that the First Nations in question had an Aboriginal right of selfgovernment which was recognised and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982.
He nonetheless dismissed the appellants' claim because they had failed to meet the Van der Peet
test by showing that the specific activity of gambling and the regulation of gambling were
integral to the distinctive cultures of their peoples prior to contact with Europeans. In so doing,
Lamer CJ expressly rejected their claim to a broad general right to govern activities, including
gambling, on their reserves. To accept that claim, he said, would `cast the Court's inquiry at an
excessive level of generality',[1]4 contrary to the Van der Peet approach. The consequences of
this decision for the Aboriginal right of self-government are devastating, as the content of that
right will have to be established item-by-item by each Aboriginal group proving the existence
and regulation prior to European contact of each specific activity over which a right is claimed.
Any possibility of claiming broadly-based Aboriginal jurisdiction over a range of activities in a
modern-day context appears to be foreclosed by the application in Pamajewon of the
particularised approach to Aboriginal rights taken in Van der Peet.
In addition to limiting Aboriginal rights by the application of this narrow, historically-rooted test,
the Supreme Court made it easier last year for rights that do meet the test to be over-ridden by
legislation. The Sparrow decision had created a test for justification of federal legislative
infringements of Aboriginal rights, by placing the burden on the Crown of proving that the
government had a valid legislative objective, and that it had respected the fiduciary duty that the
Crown owes to Aboriginal peoples. According to Sparrow, the constitutional protection accorded
to Aboriginal rights by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982 obliges the government to give
those rights priority over rights of non-Aboriginal Canadians which are not constitutionally
protected. However, in his majority judgment in Gladstone, Lamer CJ retreated from this

position and decided that, in the context of an Aboriginal right to fish commercially, that right
could be limited by taking into account such objectives as `the pursuit of economic and regional
fairness, and the recognition of the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by
non-Aboriginal groups'.[1]5 As McLachlin J pointed out in her dissenting judgment in Van der
Peet, Lamer CJ's approach to justification is `indeterminate and ultimately more political than
legal', and involves an unconstitutional `judicially authorized transfer of the Aboriginal right to
non-Aboriginals without the consent of the Aboriginal people, without treaty, and without
compensation'.[1]6
So on the issues of identification and definition of Aboriginal rights, and justification of
infringements of those rights, the Supreme Court has adopted a restrictive approach which in my
view violates the spirit of Sparrow.[1]7 There are, however, some positive elements in the
Court's Aboriginal rights decisions last year. In Gladstone, the Court did accept an Aboriginal
right (albeit narrow) to fish commercially. In R v Nikal,[1]8 another British Columbia case, the
Court exempted the appellant from a requirement to obtain a fishing licence because the
conditions of the licence infringed his Aboriginal right to fish, and the infringement had not been
shown to be justified.[1]9 In R v Adams[2]0 and R v Coté,[2]1 both involving Aboriginal fishing
rights in Quebec, the Court finally put to rest the old argument that no Aboriginal rights exist in
the areas of Canada originally colonised by France. In R v Badger,[2]2 a case from Alberta which
has significance for Manitoba and Saskatchewan as well, the Court decided that the Natural
Resources Transfer Agreement (1930) did not extinguish and replace treaty rights to hunt;[2]3
but consistently with the restrictive trend outlined above, the Court made it possible for
provincial legislatures to infringe constitutionally-protected hunting rights by application of the
Sparrow test for justification.[2]4
A major issue left open by last year's decisions is the nature of Aboriginal title. In Van der Peet,
Lamer CJ stated that `Aboriginal title is the aspect of Aboriginal rights related specifically to
Aboriginal claims to land'.[2]5 In Adams and Coté, the Court held that specific Aboriginal rights
such as a right to fish can exist independently of Aboriginal title. However, as none of the cases
the Court decided last year involved a claim to Aboriginal title, the extent to which the Van der
Peet test will be applied to such a claim remains uncertain. My view on this issue is that the
particularised approach to Aboriginal rights taken in Van der Peet is inappropriate where a claim
to Aboriginal title is concerned. Where, for example, an Aboriginal people is able to establish
that they were in exclusive possession of lands at the time of European colonisation, then, as
Brennan J (as he then was) said in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2],[2]6 the ownership of those lands
must be vested in that people. Ownership in this context means that the people, as the High Court
held to be the case for the Meriam people of the Murray Islands, are `entitled as against the
whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands'.[2]7 In Mabo [No. 2],
that entitlement to exclusive use and enjoyment was not limited to activities that were integral to
the distinctive culture of the Meriam people prior to contact with Europeans. [2]8 To apply the
Van der Peet test to Aboriginal title would reduce that title to a collection of particular
Aboriginal rights, each of which would have to be established independently. That would render
Aboriginal title meaningless as a distinct concept, and run counter to the common law principle
that title to land flowing from possession automatically entails a bundle of rights without the
necessity of proof of an independent basis for each of those rights.[2]9

This important issue of the nature of Aboriginal title will come before the Supreme Court of
Canada in June of this year, when the appeal in Delgamuukw v British Columbia[3]0 is argued. In
that case, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples are contending that they have unextinguished
Aboriginal title and rights of self-government over their traditional territories in British
Columbia. One can only hope that the Court will recognise that the Van der Peet approach to
identifying and defining specific Aboriginal rights, such as a right to fish, cannot be applied to
Aboriginal title.
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